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Abstract
The “unification” of fundamental physical forces (interactions) imagines a “single” conceptual
entity using which all the observable or physical phenomena, ie, changes to physical bodies,
would be suitably describable. The physical, conceptual and mathematical, framework which
achieves this is that of the recently proposed Universal Theory of Relativity [3]. Here, we argue
that the mathematical framework required to achieve the “unification” should be that of the
general Category Theory. There are certain unanswered mathematical questions arising out of
this context. In the sequel, we also point out these issues for the wider attention.
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Physics is our attempt to conceptually grasp the happenings of the observable world.
Various physical concepts are also succinctly expressible in the language of mathematics.
Laws of Physics are therefore mathematical statements about mathematical structures
representing “observable” or “physical” bodies. Unless the theory (concepts and their
mathematical representations, both) is appropriate, it will fail to explain, at least, “some”
observations. Needs of “appropriate” physical concepts and mathematical structures to
represent them are, both, then evident [12].
Experiments “verify” theoretical explanations of phenomena and, in turn, indicate the
appropriateness of our choice of, both, the physical conceptions and the mathematical
structures representing them. There also are purely logical methods to decide, at least
partly, this appropriateness. These methods determine the mutual compatibility of our
concepts, ie, the internal consistency of the theoretical framework.
Using any of these above methods, we then judiciously accept or reject any conceptual
framework as an admissible theory of the observable world. When an internally consistent
theory fails to explain some observations, we need to expand the conceptual basis of that
theory and, hence, mathematical structures representing those concepts. As an acceptable
explanation of the observable world, the conceptual framework of the “expanded” theory
must also be internally consistent in the sense of Logic.
Currently, physical explanations rely on four basic forces (of newtonian conceptual
origin as “means” to cause “changes” to physical bodies), viz, gravity, electromagnetism,
weak nuclear, and strong nuclear interactions. The present goal of theoretical physics is of
“unifying” these four independent forces. Clearly, this aim requires appropriate physical
concepts and their mathematical representations, both.
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Einstein [1, 2], from (only an apparently) different perspective than that of the above,
arrived at the Principle of General Relativity that the Laws of Physics be applicable with
respect to all the systems of reference, in relative acceleration or not, without unnatural
forces (whose origin is not in physical or observable bodies) entering into them. Then,
the Laws of Physics should be based on the same mathematical structures, and be also
the same mathematical statements, for all the reference systems.
Changes in physical bodies are the physical phenomena. Physical reference systems are
physical bodies used as reference. This situation provides [3, 4, 5, 6] us a guiding principle:
mathematical structure(s) representing physical bodies be such that phenomena become
‘changes’ to (mathematical structure of) reference systems themselves.
Here, the unification of basic forces is closely related to Einstein’s principle of general
relativity and the aforementioned guiding principle, the former principle helping us with
the formulations of various physical laws and the latter principle helping us select the
unifying mathematical structure. This is the theoretical framework which I had called as
the Universal Theory of Relativity [3].
Now, the “unification” of fundamental physical interactions must postulate “some”
single mathematical entity that “represents” not only all the characteristics of physical
bodies but also their “changes” (mathematical transformations).
Then, we note that a mathematical transformation essentially “knows” about the
mathematical structure it “transforms”. This single concept, that of the transformation of
a mathematical structure representing all the characteristics of physical bodies, appears
to possess therefore the ingredients necessary to be the single conceptual entity capable
of “unifying” the four fundamental forces.
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This is the same as in the case of a category. A category, C, is usually defined in terms
of two collections - the first, Co, of objects and the second, CA, of arrows or transformations
and four suitable operations on collections Co and CA satisfying conditions naturally arising
for them to be mutually compatible operations.
However, a category is also definable [7, 8, 9, 10] in terms of only CA, in an object-free
manner. Objects serve only to index (identity) arrows as far as the functions [13] from a
subset of CA× CA to CA are concerned. Thus, a category can be defined using only CA and
the binary operation of composition of arrows, an operation which is not always defined
and is subject to naturally arising compatibility conditions.
Categorical foundations of the aim of “unification” are then manifest. We focus either
on a suitable mathematical structure possessing all the characteristics of physical bodies
and consider appropriate means (equations) arising out of its possible transformations
to arrive at physically verifiable conclusions or, completely equivalently, on general
transformations (as arrows of an abstract category) and ‘extract’ all the characteristics
of physical bodies from these transformations alone.
We now turn to some reasons as to why only the most general mathematical framework
of the Category Theory, and nothing short of it, is suitable for concepts behind universal
relativity or the unification of basic interactions.
The representation (originating with Euclidean and Cartesian conceptions) of physical
bodies by points is inadequate vis-a’-vis the principle of general relativity and the
aforementioned guiding principle, both: with it, reference systems do not “change” with
the occurrence of observable phenomena. We thus require a mathematical notion other
than a point to represent physical bodies.
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We may then choose to represent a physical body by a collection of “points”. Now,
any physical body can be considered to possess a “boundary”. (But, see discussion later.)
Then, the “interior” of such a set with boundary is an “open” subset of suitable topological
space X constructible out of many such points. Thus, we could represent physical bodies
by open subsets of the corresponding topological space X .
However, if we consider a physical body as a (collection of) open subset(s) of an under-
lying topological space X , then it will, mathematically equivalently, be also represented
[4, 5, 6] as a spatial Frame [11].
Technically speaking, a Frame is a complete lattice [14], denoted by L, in which binary
meet distributes over arbitrary joins, ie, x ∧
∨
S =
∨
{x ∧ y|y ∈ S} for all x ∈ L and
S ⊆ L. In considering a Frame, we thus focus essentially on the concept of an “order”
definable on a set, for example, order by “inclusion” of one open subset in another open
subset. (This is in contrast to the notion of a neighborhood of a point on which topological
considerations focus by generalizing relevant properties of the (Euclidean) real line.) In
this last case, we regain the topology on a set from the order by inclusion on the class of
its (open) subsets, and such Frames are called the spatial Frames.
For a space X , the lattice of its open subsets, OX , forms, trivially, a spatial Frame.
Now, the topology of a space X is always obtainable from suitable spatial Frame, but the
Frame, in general, need not [15] correspond to topology on any space X .
In categorical notions, the category SpFrm of spatial Frames is a full sub-category of
the category Frm of Frames. Also, the category opposite [16] to Frm is called the category
Loc of locales, the notion of a “Locale” being reminiscent of that of the neighborhood of
a point of a set. This is the framework of the Point-free Topology [11].
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Now, the concept of the boundary of a physical body is not any fundamental physical
notion of the collection of points making up that body. We could, in its place, then focus
on “orders” imposable on the set of points constituting a physical body, that is to say, we
could choose to represent a physical body by a Frame.
Then, representation of some properties of material bodies will involve mathematical
structures (measures or generalizations thereof) defined over Frames or over the arrows
of Frm. Corresponding notions have not been developed as yet.
A map h : L → M between Frames L and M preserving finite meets (including 1)
and arbitrary joins (including 0) is called a Frame homomorphism. Such maps could then
represent observable phenomena affecting physical reference systems.
So far, the collection of points constituting a physical body is treated as a set from the
intuitive set theory (to avoid paradoxes like Russell’s paradox). This too is not mandatory.
The set-theoretic restrictions can then be relaxed [8, 9] in the setting of a Quasi-Category
which uses a collection of objects (classes) as a conglomerate [17].
We could then represent a physical body as an object (class) of the Quasi-Category.
Presently however, a general mathematical structure (measures or generalizations thereof)
to represent all the physical characteristics of observable bodies does not seem to have
been developed within this framework or within its object-free form.
Nonetheless, Category Theory [7, 8, 9, 10] does appear to provide [4, 5, 6] a mathe-
matical basis to conceptions behind the unification of all the basic physical interactions.
Notably, very general physical and mathematical conceptions are identical then. Much
work is of course needed before the physical concepts of universal relativity or of unification
of forces can be mathematically represented in a satisfactory way.
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In the end, we emphasize that the approach adopted here is also logically compelling
if Mathematics is indeed the tool to represent our physical conceptions.
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